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Abstract: In this paper we employ a computable general equilibrium model of the Russian economy to 
assess the impact of accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), which encompasses improved 
market access, tariff reduction and reduction of barriers against multinational service providers. We 
assume that foreign direct investment in business services is necessary for multinationals to compete well 
with Russian business service providers, but cross-border service provision is also present. The model 
incorporates productivity effects in both goods and services markets endogenously, through a Dixit-Stiglitz 
framework. The ad valorem equivalent of barriers to foreign direct investment have been estimated based 
on detailed questionnaires completed by specialized research institutes in Russia. We estimate that Russia 
will gain about 7.2 percent of the value of Russian consumption in the medium run from WTO accession 
and up to 24 percent in the long run. We estimate that the largest gains to Russia will derive from 
liberalization of barriers against multinational service providers. Piecemeal and systematic sensitivity 
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The Impact of Liberalizing Barriers to Foreign Direct Investment in Services: 
The Case of Russian Accession to the World Trade Organization 
 
I. Introduction 
Russia applied for membership in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in June 
1993 and the GATT Working Party was transformed into the World Trade Organization (WTO) Working 
Party in 1995. After years of negotiations, momentum for accession built when President Vladimir Putin 
made accession a priority of his administration.  
In Russia, numerous industrialists, policy analysts and even the former Prime Minister have called 
for an assessment of the gains and losses from WTO accession and for an assessment of the impact on 
different sectors of the economy. Russian goods providers are concerned that a fall in tariffs will imply 
increased competition from foreign goods providers and a decline in their market share. Russian service 
providers are concerned that liberalized rules on new foreign direct investment (FDI) will lead to increased 
competition from multinational service providers in Russia. The government has appropriately replied that 
when the economy as a whole is considered, the reduction in the tariff in any one sector does not mean that 
sector will decline, i.e., in general equilibrium the effects may be favorable for many sectors whose 
protection is cut. Moreover, the government argues that Russian exporters will obtain improved access to 
the markets of WTO member countries. But some commentators remain skeptical, in part because there is 
a lack of quantitative estimates of the impacts, and in part because the sources of the gains have not been 
well articulated.   
In this paper we develop a 35-sector, small open economy, comparative static computable general 
equilibrium model of Russia that we believe is appropriate to evaluate the impact of Russian accession to 
the WTO. We document that although the Russian tariff structure has some problem areas and can be 
liberalized, it is not a highly distorted tariff structure. On the other hand, barriers to foreign direct investors 
in several key business service sectors are quite substantial and are the focus of intense negotiations 
between Russia and the WTO Working Party. Consequently, a serious evaluation of Russian WTO 
accession requires developing a model that is capable of assessing the impact of liberalization of barriers 
on FDI in the service sector.   3
Our key modeling assumptions are that: a substantial portion of business services require a 
domestic presence; multinational service providers import some specialized capital or labor as part of their 
decision to establish a domestic presence; and business services supplied with a domestic presence are 
supplied by imperfectly competitive firms that produce a unique variety of the service. We adopt the Dixit-
Stiglitz-Ethier structure for business services (and for goods with increasing returns to scale) that implies 
endogenous productivity gains from the net introduction of new varieties.
1  
We argue that the gains to Russia from WTO accession derive from four principal effects. First, 
there will be improved access to the markets of non-CIS countries in selected products. Russia has already 
negotiated most-favored nation (MFN) status on a bilateral basis with most of its important trading 
partners, so Russia’s exporters will not see an immediate reduction in the tariffs they face and this effect 
may not be expected to be large. But Russia will have improved rights under anti-dumping and 
countervailing duty investigations in its export markets, which is the source of the improved access we 
model.
2  Second, tariff reduction on goods will induce improved domestic resource allocation and increase 
the number of varieties of imports in imperfectly competitive sectors. The latter will increase total factor 
productivity in downstream sectors due to a Dixit-Stiglitz-Ethier externality. Third, reduction in barriers 
against multinational service providers will increase the number of service varieties available in Russia. 
The increase in variety will increase total factor productivity (or lower the quality-adjusted costs) in sectors 
that use business services. Fourth, there will be positive effects on the investment climate from increases in 
the rate of return to capital. We model this impact in a comparative steady-state model, which produces an 
upper bound estimate of the gains from an increase in capital stock due to trade liberalization. 
This paper is innovative because it is the first paper to numerically assess liberalization of barriers 
against foreign direct investors in business services in a multi-sector applied general equilibrium model 
                                                            
1 Elasticities of substitution for product categories in the Dixit-Stiglitz framework have been estimated by Broda and 
Weinstein (2004). They estimate that, although there are variances within the groups, for agriculture, services and 
goods the Dixit-Stiglitz elasticitiy of substitution is close to three. We choose three as our central Dixit-Stiglitz 
elasticity of substitution. 
2 WTO accession will grant an “injury determination” to Russia in antidumping cases in WTO members countries. 
Combined with the decision by the US to treat Russia as a market economy will imply Russian exporters may have 
considerably improved rights in these cases in the US. But market economy status may be denied in particular cases, 
so it will be necessary to see how this is implemented in practice.   4
where the Dixit-Stiglitz variety-productivity effects are important to the results. There have been a number 
of theoretical papers modeling foreign direct investment liberalization in services (Markusen (1989; 1990) 
and Markusen and Venables (1998; 2000)). Regarding numerical efforts, Markusen, Rutherford and Tarr 
(2000) develop a stylized model where foreign direct investment is required for entry of new multinational 
competitors in services, but they do not apply this model to the data of an actual economy. Brown and 
Stern (2001) and Dee et al. (2003) employ multi-country numerical models with many of the same features 
of  Markusen, Rutherford and Tarr. Their models contain three sectors –– agriculture, manufacturing and 
services –– and are thus also rather stylized. Results in the Brown and Stern paper depend crucially on 
capital flows between nations. For example, they estimate that Japan will lose from multilateral 
liberalization of barriers to FDI service providers because Japan is a capital exporting nation.  In Dee et al. 
(2003), multinationals are assumed to capture the quota rents initially. So results of liberalization depend 
crucially on the fact that liberalization transfers rents to capital-importing countries. The Dixit-Stiglitz 
endogenous productivity effect from the impact of service sector liberalization on product variety is not 
mentioned in the results of Brown and Stern, and is interpreted as of little relevance in Dee et al.
 3  
We estimate that the gains to Russia (measured as Hicksian equivalent variation) from WTO 
accession are 7.2 percent of Russian consumption (or 3.3 percent of GDP) in the medium run, and could 
be as high as 23.6 percent of Russian consumption (11.0 percent of GDP) in the long run (using our 
comparative steady-state model). To understand the sources of these gains, we execute several scenarios 
that allow us to decompose the impacts.  Tariff reform only is responsible for 1.3 percentage points of the 
gain in consumption. Improved market access accounts for 0.6 percentage points of the welfare gain. We 
estimate that the gains from FDI liberalization in services are 5.2  percent of the value of Russian 
consumption, which amounts to over 70 percent of the total gains from Russian WTO accession. Thus, 
while improving its offer to foreign service providers within the context of the GATS has been one the 
most difficult aspects of Russia’s negotiation for WTO accession, our estimates suggest that the most 
                                                            
3 There have also been numerical estimates of the benefits of services liberalization where services trade is treated 
analogously to goods trade, i.e. trade in services is assumed to be entirely cross-border and subject to tariffs.  For 
example, see Brown, Deardorff, Fox and Stern (1996).  5
important component of WTO accession for Russia in terms of the welfare gains is liberalization of its 
barriers against FDI in service sectors.    
The crucial importance in the Russian context of liberalization of barriers to FDI reflects the 
starting point of the analysis; that is, we assess that Russia has done more to lower it tariffs on goods than it 
has to liberalize its barriers to FDI in service sectors. The ad valorem equivalence of the barriers to foreign 
direct investors in business services has been estimated specifically for this study, as explained below. 
These estimates were based on surveys we commissioned of specialized service sector institutes in Russia 
to obtain data on the regulatory environment in the key business service sectors. 
We examine the robustness of the results through extensive sensitivity analysis both with respect 
to modeling assumptions and with respect to parameter choice. This includes systematic sensitivity analysis 
in which we execute the model 30,000 times with random selection of parameter values within their 
specified probability distributions. We produce sample distributions and 50 and 95 percent confidence 
intervals of all key variables.  
The paper is organized as follows. In section II we describe the model and the most important data. 
In section III we describe and interpret the central policy scenarios. In section IV we examine the impact of 
different modeling assumptions (or model closures) on the results and present the results of our piecemeal 
and systematic sensitivity analysis.  
 
 
II. Overview of the Model and Key Data 
 
Overview of the Model Formulation 
 
An algebraic formulation of the model is available in Jensen, Rutherford and Tarr (2004). Here we 
provide a general description. Primary factors include skilled and unskilled labor; mobile capital; sector-
specific capital in the energy sector reflecting the exhaustible resource; sector-specific capital in 
imperfectly competitive sectors; and primary inputs imported by multinational service providers, reflecting 
specialized management expertise or technology of the firm. The existence of sector-specific capital in  6
several sectors implies that there are decreasing returns to scale in the use of the mobile factors, and the 
supply curves in these sectors slope up.     
There are 35 sectors shown in table 1. Regardless of sector, all firms minimize the cost of 
production. One category of sectors is competitive goods and services sectors produced under constant 
returns to scale and where price equals marginal costs with zero profits. This includes agriculture, forestry 
and construction. It also includes certain public services, like education and post office facilities, and key 
mineral industries.
4 In these sectors, products are differentiated by country of origin, i.e., we employ the 
Armington assumption. All Russian goods-producing firms (including imperfectly competitive firms) can 
sell on the domestic market or export.  Russian firms optimize their output decision between exports and 
domestic sales based on relative prices and their constant elasticity of transformation production function. 
Goods produced subject to increasing returns to scale are differentiated at the firm level. We 
assume that manufactured goods may be produced domestically or imported. Firms in these industries set 
prices such that marginal cost (which is constant) equals marginal revenue; and there is free entry, which 
drives profits to zero. For domestic firms, costs are defined by observed primary factor and intermediate 
inputs to that sector in the base year data. Foreigners produce the goods abroad at constant marginal cost 
but incur a fixed cost of operating in Russia. The cif import price of foreign goods is simply defined by the 
import price, and, by the zero profits assumption, in equilibrium the import price must cover fixed and 
marginal costs of foreign firms. We employ the standard Chamberlinian large-group monopolistic 
competition assumption within a Dixit-Stiglitz framework, which results in constant markups over 
marginal cost.  
For simplicity we assume that the composition of fixed and marginal cost is identical in all firms 
producing under increasing returns to scale (in both goods and services). This assumption in our Dixit-
                                                            
4 Although electricity and gas are monopolistically controlled, prices are controlled by the government. Thus, market 
determined pricing to exploit market power is excluded by the government, and we maintain the assumption of price 
equal to marginal costs.  7
Stiglitz based Chamberlinian large-group model assures that output per firm for all firm types remains 
constant, i.e., the model does not produce rationalization gains or losses.  
  The number of varieties affects the productivity of the use of imperfectly competitive goods based 
on the standard Dixit-Stiglitz formulation. The effective cost function for users of goods produced subject 
to increasing returns to scale declines in the total number of firms in the industry.  
  The third category of sectors is service sectors that produce in Russia under increasing returns to 
scale and imperfect competition, such as telecommunications, financial services, most business services 
and transportation services. In service sectors, we observe that some services are provided by foreign 
service providers on a cross-border basis analogous to goods providers from abroad. But a large share of 
business services are provided by service providers with a domestic presence, both multinational and 
Russian.
5 Our model allows for both types of foreign service provision in these sectors. There are cross-
border services allowed in this sector and they are provided from abroad at constant costs—this is 
analogous to competitive provision of goods from abroad. Cross-border services, however, are not good 
substitutes for service providers who have a presence in Russia.
6 
There are also multinational service providers that choose to establish a presence in Russia in order 
to compete with Russian firms directly in the Russian market. When multinational service providers decide 
to establish a domestic presence in Russia, they will import some of their technology or management 
expertise. That is, foreign direct investment generally entails importing specialized foreign inputs. Thus, 
the cost structure of multinationals differs from Russian service providers. Multinationals incur costs 
related to both imported primary inputs and Russian primary factors, in addition to intermediate factor 
inputs. Foreign provision of services differs from foreign provision of goods, since the service providers 
use Russian primary inputs. Domestic service providers do not import the specialized primary factors 
                                                            
5 One estimate puts the world-wide cross-border share of trade in services at 41 percent and the share of trade in services 
provided by multinational affiliates at 38 percent. Travel expenditures 20 percent and compensation to employees 
working abroad 1 percent make up the difference. See Brown and Stern (2001, table 1).  
6 Daniels (1985) found that service providers charge higher prices when the service is provided at a distance.  8
available to the multinationals. Hence, domestic service firms incur primary factor costs related to Russian 
labor and capital only.  These services are characterized by firm-level product differentiation. For 
multinational firms, the barriers to foreign direct investment affect their profitability and entry. Reduction 
in the constraints on foreign direct investment will induce foreign entry that will typically lead to 
productivity gains because when more varieties of service providers are available, buyers can obtain 
varieties that more closely fit their demands and needs (the Dixit-Stiglitz variety effect). 
Comparative Steady-State Formulation.  In this version of our model, we allow the capital 
stock to adjust to its steady-state equilibrium along with all of the model features we employ in our WTO 
reference case, i.e., we allow for tariff and FDI liberalization with endogenous productivity effects as 
above. We call this our comparative steady-state model. In the comparative static model, we assume that 
the capital stock is fixed and the rental rate on capital is endogenously determined. In the comparative 
steady-state model, the logic is reversed. We assume that the capital stock is in its initial steady-state 
equilibrium in the benchmark dataset, but that the capital stock will adjust to a new steady-state 
equilibrium based on a fixed rate of return demanded by investors. That is, if the trade policy shock 
happens to induce and increase in the rate of return on capital so that it exceeds the initial rate of return, 
investors will invest and expand the capital stock. Expansion of the capital stock drives down the marginal 
product of capital, i.e., it drives down the rental rate on capital, until the rate of return on capital falls back 
to the initial level.
7  To analyze trade policy, this comparative steady-state approach has been employed by 
many authors, including Harrison, Rutherford and Tarr (1996, 1997), Baldwin et al. (1999) and Francois et 
al. (1996). The approach, however, dates back to the 1970s, when Hansen and Koopmans (1972) and 
Dantzig and Manne (1974) used it. The approach ignores the foregone consumption necessary to achieve 
the higher level of investment and thus is an upper bound estimate of the long-run gains in the framework 
of the model assumptions.  
                                                            
7 The rate of return on investment in our model is the rental rate on capital divided by the cost of a unit of the capital 
good.     9
Key Data 
 
Ad Valorem Equivalence of Barriers to Foreign Direct Investment in Service Sectors.  
Among the key restrictions against multinational service providers in Russia are: Rostelecom maintains a 
monopoly on long-distance fixed-line telephone services, affiliate branches of foreign banks are prohibited, 
and there is a quota on the multinational share of the insurance market.
 8  Estimates of the ad valorem 
equivalence of these and other barriers to FDI in services are key to the results. Consequently, we 
commissioned 20-page surveys from Russian research institutes that specialize in these sectors and 
econometric estimates of these barriers based on the surveys.   
The questionnaires provided us with data and descriptions and assessments of the regulatory 
environment in these sectors.
 9  Using this information and interviews with specialist staff in Russia, as 
well as supplementary information, Kimura, Ando and Fujii  (2004a, 2004b, 2004c) then  estimate the ad 
valorem equivalence of barriers to foreign direct investment in several Russian sectors, namely in 
telecommunications; banking, insurance and securities; and maritime and air transportation services. The 
process involved converting the answers and data of the questionnaires into an index of restrictiveness in 
each industry. Kimura et al. then applied methodology explained in the volume by C. Findlay and T. 
Warren (2000), notably papers by  Warren (2000), McGuire and Schulele (2000) and Kang (2000).  For 
each of these service sectors, authors in the Findlay and Warren volume evaluated the regulatory 
environment across many countries. The price of services is then regressed against the regulatory barriers 
to determine the impact of any of the regulatory barriers on the price of services. Kimura et al. then assume 
that the international regression applies to Russia. Applying that regression and their assessments of the 
                                                            
8 The protocol on Russian accession signed between the European Union and Russia on May 21, 2004 calls for the 
termination of the Rostelekom monopoly by 2007 and allows for an increase in the upper limit on the multinational 
share of the Russian insurance market. See UNCTAD (1996) or Brown and Stern (2001, table 2) for a complete list 
of barriers to FDI worldwide. 
9   This information was provided by the following Russian companies or research institutes: ZNIIS in the case of 
telecommunications, Expert RA for banking, insurance and securities; Central Marine Research and Design Institute 
(CNIIMF) for maritime transportation services and Infomost for air transportation services. We thank Vladimir 
Klimushin of ZNIIS; Dmitri Grishankov and Irina Shuvalova of  ExpertRA; Boris Rybak and Dmitry Manakov of 
InfoMost; and Tamara Novikova, Juri Ivanov and  Vladimir Vasiliev of CNIIMF. The questionnaires are available at  10
regulatory environment in Russia from the questionnaires and other information sources, they estimate the 
ad valorem impact of a reduction in barriers to foreign direct investment in these service sectors.
10 The 
results of the estimates are listed in table 2.
 11  In the case of maritime and air transportation services, we 
assume that the barrier will only be cut by 15 percentage points, since pressure from the Working Party in 
these sectors is not strong.  
Share of Expatriate Labor Employed by Multinational Service providers. The impact of 
liberalization of barriers to foreign direct investment in business service sectors on the demand for labor in 
these sectors will depend importantly on the share of expatriate labor used by multinational firms. We 
explain in the results section that despite the fact that multinationals use Russian labor less intensively than 
their Russian competitors, if multinationals use mostly Russian labor, their expansion is likely to increase 
the demand for Russian labor in these sectors.
12  We obtained estimates of the share of expatriate labor or 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
www.worldbank.org/trade/russia-wto. The same sources provided the data on share of expatriate labor discussed 
below. 
10   Warren estimated quantity impacts and then using elasticity estimates was able to obtain price impacts. The 
estimates by Kimura et al. that we employ are for “discriminatory” barriers against foreign direct investment. Kimura 
et al. also estimate the impact of barriers on investment in services that are the sum of discriminatory and non-
discriminatory barriers.  
11   Kimura et al. estimated that the price of telecommunications services in Russia are elevated by 10  percent due 
to barriers to multinational service providers. We believe that in telecommunications it is crucial to employ a 
differentiated product model to characterize competition between multinational and Russian telecommunications 
providers. This means that we interpret the estimates of Kimura et al. to indicate that the discriminatory tax on 
multinational service providers results in a 10 percent increase in the composite price of domestic and multinational 
service provision. Then the ad valorem tax on multinationals, say at rate x, must be above 10 percent since there is 
no discriminatory tax on domestic service providers and the composite price is a weighted average of domestic 
prices (which are untaxed) and multinational prices which are taxed at a rate x.  More precisely, if x is the ad 
valorem equivalent of the barriers to multinational investment in telecommunications in Russia, s is the share of the 
market in Russia of multinationals, 10 percent is the amount by which telecommunications prices are elevated due to 
the barriers and if we assume Russian domestic service providers prices are unaffected, then we may solve for x 
from:  sx + (1-s)*0 = .10. That is, x= .10/s  Our data indicate that s = .15, then x = .67 or 67 percent.  
  Barriers to foreign direct investment, however, have an indirect effect on the price of Russian 
telecommunications services. Consequently, sx + (1-s)*y = .10 may be more appropriate, where y is the amount by 
which the price of Russian telecommunication services are increased in the benchmark as a result of barriers on 
multinational telecommunications service providers. The value of y would have to be less than the value of the 
increase in composite services (0.1). It is likely that the indirect effect of barriers to foreign direct investment on the 
price of domestic Russian telecommunications services is less than 0.05, since the composite price increased by only 
0.1 and lower values of y yield higher estimates of x. But if we take y=.05, then x equals 0.38, which is 
approximately the value estimated for financial services, of 0.33. We take a conservative estimate here of 0.33 for 
telecommunications.  
12 See Markusen, Rutherford and Tarr (2000) for a detailed explanation on why FDI may be a partial equilibrium 
substitute for domestic labor but a general equilibrium complement.   11
specialized technology not available to Russian firms that is used by multinational service providers in 
Russia from Russian research institutes that specialize in these sectors. In general, we found that 
multinational service providers use mostly Russian primary factor inputs and only small amounts of 
expatriate labor or specialized technology. In particular, the estimated share of foreign inputs used by 
multinationals in Russia is: telecommunications, 10 percent plus or minus 2 percent; financial services, 3 
percent, plus or minus 2 percent; maritime transportation, 3 percent, plus or minus 2 percent; and air 
transportation, 12.5 percent, plus or minus 2.5 percent. 
Tariff and Export Tax data. We estimate the tariff and export tax rates by sector in our model 
based on the following data and methodology. For the purpose of calculating the tariff and export tax rates, 
we obtained data on the trade flows from the 2001 Customs Statistics on the External Trade of the Russian 
Federation («Таможенная Статистика Внешней Торговли Российской Федераций»), a yearly 
publication from the Russian Customs Committee.
13 Import tariff rates and export taxes at the tariff line 
level were obtained from official government decrees available online; the data are current as of August 
2002.
14    
  Based on a Goskomstat a mapping from the tariff line data of the Customs Committee to the sectors 
in our input-output table, we calculated a weighted average tariff rate for the sectors of our model. We 
calculated these rates two ways: based on all imports (where the collected tariff rate as a percentage of all 
imports is 8.1 percent) and on non-CIS imports (where the collected tariffs as a percentage of non-CIS 
imports is 11.1 percent). The rates we employ in the model are the rates based on all imports. The rates 
based on all imports are lower because the base in the calculation includes CIS imports on which no tariffs 
are imposed. We believe collected tariff rates more closely approximate the protection a sector receives and 
the incentives it faces.  Similar procedures are applied for export taxes. The results at the sector level are in 
table 2.  
                                                            
13 The data in this paper, which were entered manually, are based on a level of aggregation reported by the Customs 
Committee that yields about 2000 tariff lines. We thank Ekaterina Krivonos and Eshref Trushin for their work on 
these data.  
14 The regulations can be found on the web page of the Customs Computer Service: www.tks.ru  in the document 
database (Базы данных →  Документы).  12
Applying these tariff rates across all sectors implies that tariff revenue in our model is about 1.6 
percent of GDP in the initial equilibrium. Collected tariffs in Russia are closer to 1.1 percent of GDP.
15 
There are several reasons why the collected tariffs in Russia are less than the legal rates on most favored 
nation (MFN) imports. Most notably, exemptions to the Russian tariff are available for regional agreements 
(most notably the CIS), personal imports and shuttle trade. Since we have data for CIS trade, we adjust for 
it by applying the MFN rates on all imports from the non-CIS. This slightly but not significantly biases 
upward the rates we employ relative to collected rates. 
Export Tax Data.  Analogous to the import trade data, the Russian State Customs Committee 
publishes data on export volumes and values. These data were also entered manually at the tariff line level. 
Unlike the tariff data that are listed by the Customs Committee, it was necessary to consult numerous 
regulations of the government of Russia to obtain the export taxes. Similar to the tariff data, the export 
taxes are sometimes ad valorem or sometimes the maximum of the ad valorem or specific tax rate. The 
results are reported in table 2.
16 
Input-output table. The core input-output model is the 1995 table produced by Goskomstat. The 
official table contained only 22 sectors, and importantly has little service sector disaggregation. 
Consequently, Russian input-output expert S. P. Baranov disaggregated this table into a 35 sector input 
output table. Baranov used unpublished data available to Goskomstat based on the surveys that were used 
to construct the 1995 table. The principal elements of this disaggregation were: a split of the oil and gas 
sector into oil, gas and oil processing; a split of the transport sector into railroad, maritime, air, pipeline, 
truck and other transportation services; the breakup of communication into post services and 
telecommunications; and disaggregation of the data in several business service sectors regarding market 
and non-market activities. The documentation by Baranov is available on the website listed above. 
 
 
                                                            
15 International Monetary Fund, “Russian Federation: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix,” 2002.  
16 We thank Jan Strelka for painstaking work on the export data, which he compiled into a spreadsheet. He has also 
documented this work, including his sources for the export tax data.   13
III. Results 
In our general WTO scenario, we assume that barriers against foreign direct investment 
are reduced as indicated in table 2; seven sectors subject to antidumping actions in export 
markets receive slightly improved market access. This is implemented as an exogenous increase 
in their export price as shown in table 2; and the tariff rates of all sectors are reduced by 50 
percent.
17 We first discuss (and present in table 3) our estimates of the impact of Russian WTO 
accession on aggregate variables such as welfare and the real exchange rate, aggregate exports, 
the return to capital, skilled labor and unskilled labor, and the percentage change in tariff 
revenue. In order to obtain an assessment of the adjustment costs, we estimate the percentage of 
labor and mobile capital that must change industries. The gains come from a combination of 
effects, so we also estimate the comparative static impacts of the various components of WTO 
accession in order to assess their relative importance. 
  First we discuss the comparative static results. We shall also consider the results of assuming the 
time frame is long enough for capital to adjust to its new long-run, steady-state equilibrium in a scenario 
we call comparative steady-state. In addition, we evaluate a “short-run” scenario, in which all labor is 
“sector-specific”.  
Aggregate Welfare Effects of WTO Accession 
  We estimate that the welfare gains to Russia are equal to 7.2 percent of Russian consumption (or 
3.3 percent of GDP) in the medium term. These gains derive from three key effects: (1) improved access to 
the markets of non-CIS countries in selected products; (2) Russian tariff reduction; and (3) liberalization of 
barriers to foreign direct investment in services sectors. We execute three scenarios that allow us to 
understand the relative impact of these various elements and the mechanisms through which they operate.  
Impact of Tariff Reduction. The results for this scenario are presented in column (2) of table 3. 
We lower tariffs by 50 percent, but there is no liberalization of the barriers to FDI or improved market 
access. The estimated welfare gains to the economy are 1.3 percent of consumption or 0.6 percent of GDP.  
                                                            
17 Actual tariff reductions remain are part of the accession negotiations and are not known with certainty.   14
The gains to the economy from tariff reduction alone come about for two reasons. Tariff reduction 
in Russia will lead to improved domestic resource allocation since tariff reduction will induce Russia to 
shift production to sectors where production is valued more highly based on world market prices. This is 
the fundamental effect from trade liberalization in constant returns to scale models (CRTS). In addition, 
tariff reduction on imports in imperfectly competitive sectors, raises the tariff ridden demand curve for 
imports. This increases profitability for foreigners of selling in the Russian market thereby inducing new 
entry by foreign suppliers until zero profits are restored. Although there is a loss of domestic varieties due 
to increased foreign competition, there is a net increase in varieties. The additional varieties in the 
imperfectly competitive sectors of Russia result in a productivity improvement for users of these goods 
through the Dixit-Stiglitz-Ethier effect. This result is analogous to the result found by Rutherford and Tarr 
(2002) in a fully dynamic model.  
Impact of Improved Market Access. In column (3) of table 3, we present the results of a 
scenario in which we allow for improved market access (according to the terms of trade improvements of 
table 2), but we do not lower tariffs or barriers to FDI in services sectors. We estimate that the impact of 
improved market access at 0.6 percent of consumption (0.3 percent of GDP). Gains derive from improved 
prices for exports. But also a higher value for exports allows Russia to buy more imports and more 
varieties of imports increase productivity. Thus, the impact of improved market access is greater in a model 
with Dixit-Stiglitz variety effects than in a constant returns to scale model. 
Impact of Foreign Direct Investment Liberalization in Business Services.  In this scenario, 
labeled reform of FDI barriers in column (4) of table 3, we eliminate or reduce the discriminatory tax on 
multinationals in the service sectors (as shown in table 2), but there is no reduction in tariffs or improved 
market access. The reduction in the discriminatory tax on multinationals increases profitability for 
provision of services in Russia by multinationals, thereby inducing new entry by multinational service 
providers until zero profits are restored. Although there is a loss of domestic service varieties due to 
increased multinational foreign competition, there is a net increase in varieties. Russian businesses will 
then have improved access to the services of multinational service providers in areas like 
telecommunication, banking, insurance, transportation and other business services. The additional service  15
varieties in the business service sectors should lower the cost of doing business and result in a productivity 
improvement for users of these goods through the Dixit-Stiglitz-Ethier effect. We estimate that the gains to 
Russia from liberalization of barriers to FDI in services are about 5.2 percent of the value of Russian 
consumption or about 72 percent of the total gains to Russia of WTO accession. 
 
Sector Results 
  Expanding Manufacturing Sectors. Sectors we estimate will expand are those that either: export 
a relatively large share of their output; obtain an exogenous increase in export prices as a result of WTO 
accession; are relatively unprotected initially compared to other sectors of the economy; or experience a 
significant reduction in the cost of their intermediate inputs, typically because they have a large share of 
intermediate inputs that come from sectors that experience productivity advances due to trade or FDI 
liberalization. 
The manufacturing sectors that we estimate are likely to expand their output the most are non-
ferrous metals, ferrous metals and chemicals. (See Jensen, Rutherford and Tarr (2004) for detailed sector 
results.) These three sectors are among the sectors that we assume will gain an exogenous increase in the 
price of its exports upon WTO accession. They are also among those that export the highest share of their 
output—they all export over thirty percent of the value of their output. Export intensity is important 
because a reduction in tariffs generally depreciates the real exchange rate . Since the real exchange rate 
depreciates, sectors that export intensively will gain more domestic goods for a unit of their exports.
18  
  Declining Manufacturing Sectors. The sectors that contract the most are the sectors that are the 
most protected prior to tariff reduction and which have a relatively small share of exports. Most notably 
this includes machinery and equipment, food and light industry and construction materials. All of these 
sectors do little exporting and light industry and food are the sectors with the highest tariff rates. 
                                                            
18 The real exchange depreciates because the increased demand for imports accompanying the decline in tariffs 
induces an increase in the price of foreign exchange. In addition, the reduction in barriers to multinational investment 
in the services sector depreciates the real exchange rate. This is because multinationals use more foreign skilled 
labor, and they must pay in foreign exchange for the foreign skilled labor from domestic sales. The depreciation of 
the real exchange rate encourages exports and mutes the import expansion.  16
  Business Service Sectors.  Russian business and labor interests in these sectors are not the same, 
and we discuss the impact on labor in these sectors first. We find that skilled and unskilled employment 
will expand in most, but not all, of the business service sectors. This is an application to a full-economy 
model of the result found by Markusen, Rutherford and Tarr (2000). They show in a more stylized model 
that even when foreign direct investment is a partial equilibrium substitute for domestic skilled labor, it 
may be a general equilibrium complement. The reason is as follows. As a result of a reduction in the 
barriers to foreign direct investment in these sectors, we estimate that there will be an expansion in the 
number of multinational firms that locate in Russia to provide business services from within Russia, and a 
contraction in the number of purely Russian firms. Although multinationals also demand Russian labor, 
though they use Russian labor slightly less intensively than Russian firms. That is, since multinationals 
import primary inputs, foreign direct investment is a partial equilibrium substitute for Russian labor.  But 
as more service firms enter the market, the quality adjusted price of services falls, and industries that use 
services expand their demand for business services. On balance, the increase in labor demand from the 
increase in the demand for business services typically exceeds the decline in labor demand from the 
substitution of multinational supply for Russian supply in the Russian market. That is, FDI is a partial 
equilibrium substitute but a general equilibrium complement to Russian labor. Thus, we estimate that labor 
in the business services sectors will typically gain from an expansion in foreign direct investment and 
multinational provision of services in Russia.  
  Regarding capital, as a result of the removal of restrictions, we estimate there would be significant 
increase in foreign direct investment and an increase in multinational firms operating in Russia. We 
estimate that specific capital owners in imperfectively competitive sectors will lose from this increase in 
competition. However, we expect the increase in foreign direct investment to have diverse impacts on 
Russian firms. We define a firm as a multinational even if a foreign firm and a Russian firm have formed a 
joint venture. Multinationals will often look for Russian joint venture partners when they want to invest in 
Russia. Russian companies that become part of a joint venture in the expanding multinational share of the 
business services market will likely preserve or increase the value of their investments. Russian capital 
owners in business services who remain wholly independent of multinational firms, either because they  17
avoid joint ventures or are not desired as joint venture partners, will likely see the value of their 
investments decline, and the least efficient will exit the industry.
19  
This suggests that domestic lobbying interests within a service sector could be diverse 
regarding FDI liberalization. We estimate that labor should find it in their interest to support FDI 
liberalization even if capital owners in the sector oppose it. But capital owners themselves may 
have diverse interests depending on their prospects for acquisition by multinationals. 
 
IV. Sensitivity Analysis 
The results depend on the choice of parameters in the model as well as certain assumptions or 
closures. In this section, we evaluate the impact on the results of the changing the values of the key 
parameters or modeling assumptions in the model. We begin with key model assumptions. We then discuss 
the results of piecemeal sensitivity analysis on the parameters. Finally we discuss the results of our 
systematic sensitivity analysis.  
 
Model Assumptons 
Sensitivity Results for a 50% Cut in the Barriers to Foreign Direct Investment.  In this 
scenario, we simulate a cut in the barriers by one-half as much as in our central scenario (shown in column 
6 of table 3). But we allow for improved market access and a 50 percent cut in tariff barriers. We find that 
the gains to the economy are reduced to about 4.1 percent of consumption. From table 3, we can see this is 
slightly less than the sum of three components: (i) half of the gains from FDI liberalization; (ii) tariff 
reduction; and (iii) improved market access. 
Rent Capture or Dissipation.  Resource loss from rent seeking of licenses is a 
significant problem in Russia. In our central scenario we have ignored these costs. It may be 
appropriate, however, to assume that those that obtain the licenses use Russian capital and labor 
in wasteful license-seeking activities and the like. Then the ad valorem equivalence of the 
                                                            
19 We assume that firms in the business services sectors must use a specific factor in order to produce output. This 
specific factor results in an upward sloping supply curve in each business services sector.   18
barriers to multinational investment are a real resource cost. As a result  the estimated gains from 
WTO accession increase from 7.2 percent to 7.7 percent of consumption (as shown in column 7 
of table 3) because the resources that were used to capture the rents become available for 
productive activities.  
Similarly, if foreigners capture the rents initially, liberalization of the barriers will allow 
competition among foreigners that will result in a transfer of the rents from foreigners to Russia. 
Then we estimate the gains to Russia from WTO accession will increase from our central 
estimate of 7.2 percent to 7.5 percent of consumption. 
Sector-Specific Labor.  Although we have some sector-specific capital (varying by 
sector), in our central scenario all labor is mobile. To evaluate short-run effects, where a 
significant portion of labor will be unable to switch jobs between sectors, we assume that labor 
can not move between sectors, that is labor is “sector-specific.” With sector-specific labor, wages 
of skilled and unskilled labor will vary across sectors in response to shifts in demand coming 
from WTO accession.  
The aggregate results are presented in table 3, column 8. The welfare gains fall to 5.9 
percent of consumption. This decline in the gains is expected when labor is sector specific since 
when labor is immobile, it cannot move to the sectors where it is valued most highly. What is 
striking about this scenario is that the gains remain substantial. This shows how important 
productivity effects are since without productivity effects a model with no labor market resource 
reallocation would produce very small gains.  
While the welfare gains are smaller, no labor changes jobs in this scenario (see the rows 
on factor adjustments in table 3). So the “social” adjustment costs of labor are zero. Despite no 
dislocation of labor, the wages of workers in each sector will go up or down relative to the 
average wage in the economy for skilled or unskilled labor; thus, there are private adjustment 
costs of WTO accession, even if there are no social costs of adjustment in this short-run model.
20  
                                                            
20 See Matusz and Tarr (2000) for an elaboration of the distinction between private and social costs of adjustment.   19
CRTS model--No productivity effects. We also executed a CRTS version of our model 
where we reduced tariffs by 50 percent, allowed improved access and lowered FDI barriers. Without the 
Dixit-Stiglitz structure that provides the possibility of productivity gains, the welfare gains are reduced to 
1.2 percent of consumption.
21  
Long-Run Comparative Steady-State Results of WTO Accession. In a long-run 
analysis, we should allow for the fact that WTO accession could improve the investment climate in Russia. 
In this scenario, we employ our comparative steady-state model. As explained in section II, the principal 
feature is that we allow for the fact that accession to the WTO could increase the rate of return on 
investment.
22 This would induce an increase in the capital stock until the marginal productivity of capital 
declines sufficiently that the rate of return on investment is no higher than the initial steady-state 
equilibrium rate of return on investment. With our comparative steady-state model, we estimate that the 
gains to Russia from WTO accession are 23.7 percent of consumption (11 percent of GDP). This is more 
than three times the estimated comparative static welfare gains. The reason the gains are larger is that we 
estimate that WTO accession will induce an increase in the rental rate on capital in Russia in the 
comparative static model by 4.9  percent. In the comparative steady-state model, this induces an expansion 
of the capital stock in the new equilibrium. We estimate that the capital stock will increase by about 14.4 
percent of its initial level in the long-run steady-state equilibrium. With a higher capital stock, the economy 
is able to produce more output and there is more consumption. We typically argue that this type of model 
produces an upper bound estimate of the welfare gains because the foregone consumption necessary to 
achieve the higher capital stock is not taken into account.
23 However, Rutherford and Tarr (2002) show 
                                                            
21 Without increasing returns to scale, removing barriers to FDI has no effect.   
22 Rutherford and Tarr (2003) explain why we typically, but not always find in models with product differentiation, 
that the rate of return on investment (the rental rate on capital divided by the cost of a unit of capital) increases. This 
despite the fact that we have no a priori expectation that the rental rate on capital will rise relative to the wage rate.  
23 On the other hand, Russia has had a substantial trade surplus in the past several years; the trade surplus was $46 
billion in 2002, approximately the value of aggregate imports, which reflected decisions by Russian investors to 
invest abroad. If  WTO accession can improve the investment climate in Russia, the large annual capital outflow of 
Russia could be turned around and invested in Russia. Then, it may be possible to achieve a larger capital stock 
without the foregone consumption that is typically required.  20
that a fully dynamic model that incorporates productivity effects like those in our present model, and that 
takes into account foregone consumption from investment decisions, could produce estimated welfare 
gains that are as large or larger than these comparative steady-state results.    
Piecemeal Sensitivity Analysis  
In table 4, we present the impact on welfare of varying the value of key parameters. In these 
scenarios, we retain the central value of all parameters except the parameter in question. In general, the 
gains to the economy (welfare gains) increase with an increase in elasticities, since higher elasticities imply 
that the economy is able to more easily shift to sectors or products that are cheaper after trade and FDI 
liberalization.
24 There are two parameters in the table that have a strong impact on the results: the elasticity 
of substitution between value-added and business services (esubs) and the elasticity of multinational firm 
supply (etaf). A liberalization of the barriers to FDI will result in a reduction in the cost of business 
services, both from the direct effect of lowering the costs of doing business for multinational service 
providers and from the indirect effect that additional varieties of business services allow users to purchase 
a quality-adjusted unit of services at less cost.  When the elasticity of substitution between value added and 
business services is high, users have the greater potential to substitute the cheaper business services and 
this increases productivity. The elasticity of multinational and Russian firm supply (etaf, etad) is primarily 
dependent on the sector-specific factor for each firm type (foreign or domestic). When etaf is high, a 
reduction in the barriers to foreign direct investment results in a larger expansion in the number of 
multinational firms supplying the Russian market, and hence more gains from additional varieties of 
business services.  In addition, the share of the services market captured by multinationals has a strong 
effect, since a liberalization results in a larger number of new varieties introduced.  
Share of Expatriate Labor Employed by Multinational Service Providers. The 
impact of liberalization of barriers to foreign direct investment in business services on the 
demand for labor in the business service sectors will depend on the share of expatriate labor used 
by multinational firms. If multinationals use mostly Russian labor, their expansion is likely to 
                                                            
24 An increase in the elasticity of substitution between varieties reduces the welfare gain. This is because when 
varieties are good substitutes, additional varieties are worth less to firms and consumers.   21
increase the demand for Russian labor in these sectors. We employed the estimates of the share 
of expatriate labor or specialized technology not available to Russian firms that is used by 
multinational service providers in Russia provided by the various Russian research institutes 
mentioned above. Here we estimate the impact of employing the upper or lower bound estimates 
of this share in all business service sectors.  
We find that the impact on the welfare estimates of a lower or higher share of imported inputs in 
the business service sectors is only 0.1 percent of consumption. But the impact on labor demand in the 
business services sector is more significant. For example, skilled labor demand in telecommunications 
increases by 6.0 percent with our central estimates of labor demand change, but would increase by 7.5 
percent with the lower shares of imported inputs by multinationals and by 4.5 percent with higher shares of 
labor demand by multinationals. There is a similar range of results for labor demand in most of the 
business services sectors. With sufficiently high share of expatriate labor use by the multinationals, the 
demand for labor in the business services sectors would decline, but based on the expert estimates of the 
use of expatriate labor, we expect to see an increase in the demand for labor in telecommunications, 
financial services and truck transportation, but a decline in air transportation services and science services. 
In all these cases, the shift in employment is less than 15 percent of initial employment.  
 
Systematic Sensitivity Analysis 
 
Piecemeal sensitivity analysis shows how the results change when we vary the value of key 
parameters one by one, with central values of all parameters except the one under consideration. In the 
systematic sensitivity analysis, we allow all parameters to change simultaneously. A probability 
distribution for each parameter is chosen. We typically choose a uniform probability distribution, with the 
lower and upper bounds for the values of the parameters taken from the lower and upper values of the key 
parameters presented in table 4. We furthermore assume that all distributions are stochastically 
independent.   22
We then run the model 30,000 times. Each time the program chooses a random configuration of 
parameters and executes the model with this configuration. For each variable in our model, we then harvest 
the sample distribution based on the 30,000 solutions. Consequently the sample distribution is not 
dependent on any particular set of parameter values, but represents results representative of the full 
distribution of parameter values.  
We present the distribution of the results below for three key variables: welfare change as a 
percentage of consumption, output change and skilled employment changes. A full compendium or results 
with the sample distributions and confidence intervals is reported in Jensen Rutherford and Tarr (2004). 
For each reported variable, we calculate the percentage of solutions associated with a given result for the 
variable. The top panel in figure 2 shows that the welfare gains as a percentage of consumption are, in 
most cases, between 6 percent and 8 percent. The minimum value is 4.5 percent and the maximum value is 
11.4 percent. The bottom panel in figure 2 shows the corresponding cumulative distribution of the welfare 
gains. The statistics shows that only 6.4 percent of the solutions are below a welfare gain of 6 percent and 
that 13.0 percent are above a gain of 8 percent. More than 80 percent of the solutions yield a gain between 
6 percent and 8 percent. This shows that the welfare results are very robust within the range of 6 to 8 
percent of consumption.  
In figure 3, we focus on the employment effects in the six sectors where the impacts are the 
greatest: the three sectors with the largest increase in employment and the three sectors with the largest 
decline in employment. We only show the results for skilled labor, as the results for unskilled labor are 
very close to the results for skilled labor. We assume total employment is unchanged, so employment must 
expand in some sectors and contract in others. The sectors where employment expands the most are: 
ferrous metallurgy, non-ferrous metallurgy and chemical industry. The manufacturing sectors where 
employment declines the most are: mechanical engineering, light industry and food industry. The results 
for all six sectors show that our central results are robust to most parameter configurations, and in 
particular that the expanding (declining) sectors are expanding (declining) for virtually all configurations. 
The figure also shows that the magnitude of the results for the expanding sectors is more uncertain than the  23
results for the declining sectors. This is explained by the relatively greater use of business services and 
goods from imperfectly competitive sectors.
25 
In figure 4, we display the frequency distributions of the output changes in the same six sectors. 
The pattern of which sectors expand or contract is the same as for employment, but the results are more 
positive. Whereas economy-wide employment is fixed by assumption, output increases overall. Output 
expands due to greater efficiency in the use of resources, and, more importantly, due to greater productivity 
of factors of production from the increase in varieties of business services and differentiated goods. 
Finally, in order to display systematic sensitivity results for all industries in one figure, in the upper 
panel of figure 5 we display bars that represent 50 percent confidence intervals for aggregate output 
(exports plus domestic sales) for all industries (the point on the bar is our point estimate). In the lower 
panel of figure 5, we show 50 percent confidence intervals for domestic output by industry.  Similar 
figures for other variables are in Appendix B of Jesper, Rutherford and Tarr (2004). 
 
V. Conclusions 
In this paper we have developed an innovative, small, open-economy computable general 
equilibrium model of the Russian economy that is capable of assessing the impact of the liberalization of 
barriers against foreign direct investment. Surveys and estimates of the ad valorem equivalence of the 
barriers against foreign direct investment were prepared for this model. We find that the source of the 
largest gains to Russia from WTO accession is that additional multinational service providers will reduce 
the quality-adjusted cost of purchasing business services in Russia and that these gains are rather 
substantial when compared with the typical gains from constant returns to scale models of tariff 
liberalization. We believe that these results are consistent with the economic geography literature and the 
earlier urban economics literature that suggest that access to a diverse set of service providers with a 
domestic presence is crucial for growth. 
26 
 
                                                            
25 Thus, variation in the values of etaf, esubs and theta_fdi  have a greater impact on these sectors.  
26 See Vernon (1960), McKee (1988), Marshall (1988), Holmes (1995), Hummels (1995), Chinitz (1961) and Fujita, 
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Table 1.  List of Sectors 
 
1.  Sectors where foreign direct investment from new multinational services providers is possible 
 
RLW Railway  transportation 
TRK Truck  transportation 
PIP  Pipelines transportation  
MAR Maritime  transportation 
AIR Air  transportation 
TRO Other  transportation 
TMS Telecommunications 
SCS  Science & science servicing 
SSM  Public health & sports & social security 
ECM  Education & culture & art 
FIN  Financial services  
 
2.  Sectors where new foreign firms may provide new goods from abroad 
 
FME Ferrous  metallurgy 
NFM Non-ferrous  metallurgy 
CHM  Chemical & oil-chemical industry 
MWO  Mechanical engineering & metal-working 
TPP  Timber & woodworking & pulp & paper industry 
CNM  Construction materials industry  
CLO Light  industry 
FOO Food  industry 
OTH  Other industries  
 
3.  Competitive sectors subject to constant returns to scale 
 
ADM  Administration & public associations 
AGF  Agriculture & forestry 
COA Coalmining 
PSM  Communal & consumer services 
CON Construction 
ELE Electric  industry 
GAS Gas 
GEO  Geology & hydrometeorology 
OLE Oil  extraction 
OLP Oil  processing 
OFU  Other fuel industries  
OIN  Other goods-producing sectors  
PST Post 
CAT  Public catering  






Table 2.  Tariff Rates, Export Tax Rates, Estimated Ad Valorem Equivalence of Barriers to FDI in Services Sectors 
and Estimated Improved Market Access  
(ad-valorem in  percent) -- by sector 
 
Equivalent  percent barriers 
to FDI  
   Tariff rates  Export tax rates 
Estimated 
change in world 
market price  Base Year 
Post-WTO 
Accession 
Electric industry  4.5    0.0    0.0               
Oil extraction  0.0    7.9    0.0               
Oil processing  3.8    4.6    0.0               
Gas 0.5    18.8    0.0               
Coalmining 0.0    0.0    0.0               
Other fuel industries   2.6    2.6    0.0               
Ferrous metallurgy  2.9    0.4    1.5               
Non-ferrous metallurgy  7.4    5.3    1.5               
Chemical & oil-chemical industry  7.1    1.6    1.5               
Mechanical engineering & metal-working  7.2    0.0    0.0               
Timber & woodworking & pulp & paper industry  9.9    6.9    0.0               
Construction materials industry  10.6    1.6    0.0               
Light industry  11.8    4.1    0.5               
Food industry  11.3    3.1    0.5               
Other industries   6.4    0.0    0.5               
Agriculture & forestry  8.2    0.6    0.0               
Other goods-producing sectors   0.0    0.0    0.5               
Telecommunications                            33.0    0.0   
Science & science servicing (market)                            33.0    0.0   
Financial services                             36.0    0.0   
Railway transportation                            33.0    0.0   
Truck transportation                            33.0    0.0   
Pipelines transportation                            33.0    0.0   
Maritime transportation                            95.0    80.0   
Air transportation                            90.0    75.0   
Other transportation                            33.0    0.0   
 





Table 3: Impact of WTO Accession on Economy-Wide Variables in Russia: Policy Results and Decomposition of Effects  

































model       
      (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Aggregate welfare                 
Welfare (EV as  percent of 
consumption)   7.2 1.3  0.6  5.2  23.6  4.1  7.7 5.9 
Welfare (EV as  percent of GDP)    3.3 0.6  0.3  2.4  11.0  1.9  3.6 2.8 
                 
Government budget                 
Tariff revenue ( percent of GDP)  1.4 0.9 0.8 1.4  1.4 1.0  0.8  0.9  0.8 
Tariff revenue ( percent change)    -33.4 -38.4 8.4 10.6  -23.3  -35.4  -33.2 -35.8 
                 
Aggregate trade                 
Real exchange rate ( percent 
change)   2.6 2.0  -0.5  1.1  4.8  1.8  2.7 3.0 
Aggregate exports ( percent 
change)   13.2 7.9 1.5 3.5  24.3  10.8 13.5 9.5 
                
Returns to mobile factors                 
Unskilled Labor ( percent change)    2.5  0.4 0.1  1.9  13.2  1.0  2.7  1.9 
Skilled Labor ( percent change)    4.7 1.5  0.6  2.5  17.6  2.6  4.9 3.4 
Capital ( percent change)    4.9 2.0  0.7  3.1  19.5  3.6  4.9 4.3 
                 
Factor adjustments                 
Unskilled labor ( percent of non-
sector specific workers who change 
jobs)   2.6  1.1  0.5 1.6 4.4  1.7  2.6  0.0 
Skilled labor ( percent of non-
sector specific workers who change 
jobs)   2.1  0.4  0.4 1.5 2.5  1.0  2.2  0.0 
Capital   0.6  0.4  0.4 0.2 0.1  0.6  0.6  0.4 
                             
Source: Authors' estimates.  30





with corresponding parameter 
  
Parameter
a  Lower 
Inter-
mediate  Upper  Lower 
Inter-
mediate  Upper 
esubs 0.5  1.25  2.0  5.6  7.2  9.7 
esub 2.0  3.0  4.0  7.3  7.2  6.8 
sigmadm 2.0  3.0  4.0  7.1  7.2  7.3 
esubprimary 0.70  1.00  1.30  7.1  7.2  7.2 
esubintermed 0.0  0.0  0.25  7.2  7.2  7.4 
esubconsumer 0.5  1.0  1.5  6.8  7.2  7.5 
etadx 3.0  5.0  7.0  7.1  7.2  7.2 
etad 5.0  7.5  10.0  6.9  7.2  7.4 
Etaf 10.0  15.0  20.0  5.1  7.2  8.7 
theta_m(i)  see table below  7.1  7.2  7.2 
theta_fdi(i)  see table below  5.2  7.2  8.4 
a   The piecemeal sensitivity analysis employs central values for all parameters (see below) 
other than the tested parameter and lump sum tax replacement.  




Parameter   Central  Definitions of the parameter 
 value   
esubs  1.25  Elasticity of substitution between value-added and business services 
esub  3.0  Elasticity of substitution between firm varieties in imperfectly competitive sectors 
sigmadm  3.0  "Armington" elasticity of substitution between imports and domestic goods in CRTS sectors 
esubprimary  0.0  Elasticity of substitution between primary factors of production in value added 
esubintermed  0.0  Elasticity of substitution in intermediate production between composite Armington aggregate goods 
esubconsumer  1.0  Elasticity of substitution in consumer demand 
etadx  5.0  Elasticity of transformation (domestic output versus exports) 
etad  7.5  Elasticity of Russian service firm supply with respect to price of output 
etaf  15.0  Elasticity of multinational service firm supply with respect to price of output 
theta_m(i) varies 
share of specialized imports V as a share of value added in multinational firms in sector I in the 
benchmark equilibrium 
theta_fdi(i)  varies  share of output of service sector I captured by multinationals firms in the benchmark equilibrium 
 
Parameter values for:  theta_fdi(i)  theta_m(i) 
    low central high  low central high 
railway  transportation  0.01 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.06 
truck  transportation  0.03 0.05 0.07 0.01 0.03 0.05 
pipelines  transportation  0.01  0.03  0.05  0.05 0.1 0.15 
maritime  transportation  0.25 0.35  0.4  0.01 0.03 0.05 
air  transportation  0.15 0.25 0.35  0.1 0.125  0.15 
other  transportation  0.02 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.07 
telecommunications  0.05  0.15  0.25  0.08 0.1 0.12 
science and science servicing (market)  0.05 0.1 0.15 0.1 0.15 0.2 






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Welfare change as a percentage of consumption 
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Note: The bars show 50% confidence intervals. 
 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Note: The bars show 50% confidence intervals. 
 
Figure 5: Aggregate output and domestic outputThe Model
Thomas F. Rutherford




The model is based on the common features of general equilibrium models, including
market clearance and income balance. Optimizing choices by ￿rms imply zero pure
pro￿t with individuals ￿rms equating marginal revenue and marginal cost. Final
demand arises from a representative household who earns income from the sale
of primary factors (capital, skilled and unskilled labor). The model includes one
additional primary factor, imported-specialized inputs to FDI service ￿rms.
The government levies direct and indirect taxes and purchases a vector of goods
and services. In this section we outline the key features of the model in terms of the
objectives and constraints facing various agents.
1.1 Consumer Behavior
Private consumption in the model arises from budget-constrained utility maximiza-




￿i log(ci) (1)in which associated demand functions are de￿ned in terms of goods prices pi, con-




















i;f ￿ Rif ￿ TLS (3)
The right side of the budget constraint includes wage income, capital earnings
and net tax liabilities.




i ￿ ki, represents resource rents associated with energy producing sec-
tors (gas, coal and oil). The existence of these ￿xed factors of production implies
that the associated production sectors exhibit diminishing marginal productivity in
terms of other inputs, and changes in the marginal return to these factors determines
the supply response of resrouce sectors to changes in output prices.




This value accounts for rents which accrue to domestic and multinational ￿rms as
a result of entry and exit to the industry. The number of ￿rms of a particular type
responds to changes in pro￿tability. As ￿rms enter an industry rents associated with
these speci￿c factors increas. We interpret these inputs as scarce resources speci￿c
to domestic or multinational ￿rms.
The lump-sum tax term is determined endogenously to balance the government
budget and hold public output constant (see below).
1.2 Domestic Supply
Goods and services are produced for sale in the domestic and international markets.
A constant-elasticity-of-transformation (CET) function shows the transformation
possibilities in a given period between domestic (Di) and export (Ei) sales for a
1In the short-run version of the model we assume that labor is sector speci￿c, in which case
labor income,
P




i;‘.given composite output level (Yi). The shares of sales at home and abroad are
determined by relative prices given that ￿rms produce the ￿nal good to maximize
pro￿t subject to the CET constraint:

















In this equation parameters are the base year output for the domestic and export
markets, respectively, and ￿D is the baseline value share of domestic sales in total
sales, and ￿ is the elasticity of transformation.
Production is associated with a nested production function of materials inputs
ami, labor services L‘;i , and capital (Ki).2 Given prices of intermediate goods and
labor, the aggregate production sector operates so to minimize the costs of producing
a given output subject to the constraint:
Yi = ￿ Yi min[ami;Fi (Bi(asi);V Ai(L‘;i;Ki;))] (5)
in which ami = (am1;i;am2;i;:::) represents material inputs to sector i, while asi =
(as1;i;as2;i;:::) stands for inputs of business services. Within this function service
inputs substitute for primary factors trhough the production function Fi, Bi char-
acterizes an aggregation of business services, and V Ai represents a Cobb-Douglas
aggregate of capital, skilled and unskilled labor.
1.3 Di￿erentiated Services
Business services produced within the domestic economy are produced by two types
of imperfectly competitive ￿rms: domestic and multinational. There is a one to one
correspondence between ￿rms and their di￿erentiated service varieties. For clarity
of notation we will dispense with the sectoral index, j in this discussion and focus
on a representative aggregate of a speci￿c business service, Z. This composite is
formed as a constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) function of ZD (domestic) and
ZM (multinational) service varieties, each of which is in turn a CES function of the























where nd and nm are the number of domestic and imported service varieties, respec-
tively. The elasticities of substitution within product groups are: ￿f = 1=(1 ￿ ￿f)
for f 2 fd;mg. We require that ￿f is a number between 0 and 1, which implies that
the elasticities of substitution within product groups exceed unity.
Domestic services ZD are produced using domestic factors of production, whereas
multinational services ZM are produced using both domestic and imported inputs.
Examples of these imported inputs for services produced by multinational ￿rms in-
clude specialized technical expertise, advanced technology, management techniques
and marketing expertise. These represent a wide range of specialized inputs and
thereby capture a key di￿erence between multinational and domestic production
structures. Outputs of representative ￿rms, zdi and zmi, are produced under in-
creasing returns to scale with a ￿xed cost of entry and a constant variable cost.
Because costs involve both ￿xed and marginal compoenets, it is convenient to
express technologies for these di￿erentiated goods by cost rather than production
functions. Let CD and CM be the (total) cost functions for producing individual
domestic and multinational varieties. We impose a symmetry assumption within
￿rm types, i.e., all multinational ￿rms have identical cost structures, and all domestic
￿rms that operate have cost structures identical to other domestic ￿rms. cd and
cm represent unit variable cost functions and fd and fm represent the ￿xed costs
functions for domestic and multinational varieties respectively. Cost functions for




M(zm) = cmzm + fm
in which unit and ￿xed costs are functions of materials costs, wages, rental costs
of capital and the cost of ￿rm-type-speci￿c resources. Firm-type-speci￿c capital
implies increasing production costs for multinational ￿rms entering the domestic
market and falling costs for domestic ￿rms leaving the domestic market.
Let nd and nm as variables refer to the number of domestic and multinational
service ￿rms active in equilibrium. To simplify the interpretation of results, we
assume \large-group monopolistic competition." That is, individual ￿rms regard
themselves as too small to in￿uence the composite price of their group. This implies
that the ratio of the price of services to marginal cost is constant.
Let pzmi denote the price received by the producer of a representative multina-
tional service variety, zmi. We assume competitive demand for services, hence pzmi
is a function of the value of pZ, the market price of services:







Revenue of an individual zmi producer is price times quantity.







Large-group monopolistic competition is based on the assumption that an indi-
vidual ￿rm views Z as ￿xed or parametric and here, by extension, views ZM and
ZD as ￿xed. Thus, the individual ￿rm views all variables on the right hand side
of this equation as ￿xed except for its own output zmi. This implies that marginal








Setting marginal revenue equal to marginal cost implies that the ratio of price
to marginal cost is simply 1=￿m. We have assumed that all multinational varieties
have an identical cost structure and the demand for all multinational varieties is
identical. These \symmetry" assumptions imply that the output and price of allmultinational ￿rms that operate will be identical. We can thus write zmi = zm and
pzmi = pzm for all i. Similar conclusions follow for domestic ￿rms.
Equilibrium for a symmetric group of service ￿rms ( zm or zd) is found as the
solution to two equations and two unknowns. One equation is the individual ￿rm’s
optimization condition, marginal revenue equals marginal cost. A second condition,
arising from the free-entry condition, is that price equals average cost. This condition
determines the number of ￿rms in equilibrium.
As noted above, the crucial distinction between domestic and international ￿rms
follows from the technology through which services are produced. Domestic service
providers invoke costs which are largely based on primary factors, including labor,




Firms which provide services under FDI incur many of the same costs as domestic





pV represents the cost of specialized imported inputs and depends on the inter-
national price of these items. The domestic price of V is thus de￿ned as the product




For our type-zm ￿rms, equilibrium conditions characterizing both pro￿t maxi-
mization and zero pro￿t are given as follows (with corresponding equations for the
type-zd ￿rms):
MR = MC ) pzm￿m = cm;
and
pzm = AC ) pzm = cmzm + fm:


























= (￿m ￿ 1)
fm
cm
The output of a given variety is larger when ￿xed costs are larger relative to
marginal costs (scale economies are larger) and when the varieties are better substi-
tutes. Similar results apply for domestic type ￿rms.
In the absence of empirical evidence on the factor composition of ￿xed and
variable costs of service production w assume that ￿xed and variable costs are pro-
portional, i.e. 3
cm = ￿mfm
Dual to the output indices are cost functions. When ￿rms minimize the cost
of purchasing multinational (domestic) varieties, a cost of a unit of the composite


















where ￿f = 1
1￿￿f for f 2 fd;mg, and pzdi is the price of the output of a domestic
￿rm and nd and nm are the number of domestic and multinational ￿rms.
Substituting the symmetry of the equilibrium into the cost functions for a unit





3Both ￿xed and variable costs are then the same function of factor prices. An important
consequence of this assumption is that output per ￿rm is constant. The model thus focuses solely
on the e￿ciency impacts of FDI liberalization without introducing scale e￿ects which might further






Since the elasticities of substitution exceed unity, the cost of obtaining an aggregate
unit of multinational or domestic services decreases as the number of varieties in-
creases. That is, additional varieties convey an externality on intermediate inputs
by lowering the costs of obtaining a unit of composite services. The elasticity of
the cost of a composite unit of multinational services with respect to the number of
multinational varieties is 1 ￿￿m. Thus, an additional multinational variety conveys
a larger externality for the domestic economy the better varieties substitute for each
other. A similar argument applies for domestic varieties.









The cost of purchasing the output of domestic ￿rms is nd ￿ zd ￿ pzd, which
increases in proportion to the number of ￿mrs. But, since ￿d < 1, the e￿ective
supply to the ￿rm increases more than proportionately with the number of ￿rms.
Note in the special case of ￿rm-level product di￿erentiation in which ￿ = ￿d = ￿m
and zm = zd, Z can be written as:
Z = (nd + nm)
1=￿z
with z = zm = zd. In this case domestic and imported ￿rms, while di￿erentiated,
are perfect substitutes at the margin.
1.4 Di￿erentiated Goods
Goods produced subject to increasing returns to scale are characterized as di￿eren-
tiated products of domestic and foreign ￿rms. For simplicity, each ￿rm is assumedto produce a single variety. Aggregate supply in a given sector is represented by a







































In the ￿nal expression is output of a representative type k ￿rm, and is resource
inputs at marginal cost of all type k ￿rms.
Holding total output constant, e￿ective supply of either domestic or foreign vari-
eties of commodity i increases with (nk
i)
1￿￿
￿ , which is the \variety e￿ect multiplier."
The multiplier increases with nk
i and increases as the elasticity of substitution de-
creases toward 1.
The supply of good i equals aggregate demand, the sum of intermediate demand,
consumer demand, investment demand, government demand and the demand for




aij + ci + ￿ Ia
I
i + ￿ Ga
G
i + Ti (7)
The number of domestic and foreign varieties determine the e￿ective supply index,
Ai, and we thereby assume that the Dixit-Stiglitz productivity has an symmetric
impact on both intermediate and ￿nal demand. Changes in the number of domestic
and foreign varieties are re￿ected through changes in the price index of the com-
modity associated with Ai.
Trade and transport margin demands are assume to be proportional to aggregate
supply, hence we have a market clearance condition of the form:
Ti =
( P
j ￿ijAj i 2 (trade;transport)
0 i = 2 (trade;transport)
in which ￿ij represents the demand for margin commodity i in the distribution of
commodity j.1.5 Current Account
The model imposes a current account balance which requires that there be no change
in the current account. The current account is calculated on the basis of commodity
exports (Ei), commodity and cross-border service imports ( Mi) and the specialized
FDI-related imports (Vi). An increase (decrease) in imports must be compensated
by a corresponding decrease (increase) in exports, holding the base year current












i Vi + ￿ D
1.6 Tax Revenue and the Public Budget
In the model, the government collects a variety of indirect taxes. These taxes and the
associated ad-valorem rates include the taxes on output ( t
y
i) , taxes on intermediate
inputs (ta
ij) , tari￿s (tM
i ), taxes on public demand (tG
i ), taxes on investment demand
(tI
i) , taxes on exports (tX
ir), and taxes on consumption (tC
i ). The government budget
constraint is then:
p
GG = TY + Ta + TM + TG + TI + TX + TC + TLS
in which Tk represents revenue from tax instrument k, and TLS represents direct
(lump-sum) taxes. The model features a constant level of public provision, which is
achieved through adjustment of the level of lump sum tax.2 Variables
2.1 Sectors in the Model
y(i) yi Sectoral production. This is an index of the scale of operation describes both
inputs and outputs. Outputs are CET joint products for the domestic and
export market, with magnitudes which are determined by relative prices.
a(i) ai Armington supply. This activity delivers goods to the domestic market which
are a composition of domestic, imported and FDI inputs. It also applies trade
and transportation margins.
e(i) ei Export supply. This is an accounting activity which keeps track of the scale
of commodity exports.
m(i) mi Import activity. This is an accounting activity which keeps trace of commodity
imports. mi represents both cross-border and FDI-related imports in sector i.
s(f,i) sfi Dixit-Stiglitz supply index. This activity level is an index of FDI inputs. The
output coe￿cient for this activity incorporates variety-adjustments re￿ecting
the number of ￿rms in operation.
n(f,i) nfi Number of ￿rms. This activity accounts for ￿xed costs associated with the cre-
ation of new varieties of either domestic or multinational ￿rms in the domestic
market.
z(f,i) zfi Total cost by ￿rm type. Our model is based on an assumption of a common
factor composition of ￿xed and variable costs. This activity creates a com-
posite ￿rm-level cost index which enters into both variable and ￿xed costs of
production (sectors sfi and nfi, respectively).
2.2 Prices
pfx ￿ Price of foreign exchange. Trade balance implies no change in net indebtedness
{ the di￿erence between the CIF value of imports and the FOB value of exprots
remains unchanged as part of the any simulation.p(i) pi Armington price, a composite price index incorporating trade and transport
margins.
pd(i) pD
i Domestic market price, evaluated at producer prices.
px(i) pX
i Export price, evaluated at producer prices net of trade and transportation
margins.
pm(i) pM
i Import price, gross of tari￿ but net of trade and transport margins within the
domestic economy.
pl(l) w‘ Wage rates for skilled and unskilled labor.
rk rK Return to capital, a rental price which describes changes in the relative price
of intersectorally mobile capital.
rss(i) rS
i Return to sector-speci￿c capital which enters into the primary energy sectors
(gas,coa,ole)
pr(f,i) rR
fi Price of ￿rm-type speci￿c factor, representing infra-marginal rents for domestic
and multinational ￿rms. The presence of this speci￿c factor implies an upward-
sloping supply schedule for both domestic and multinational ￿rms.
pds(f,i) pDS
fi Variety-adjusted price of Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate, a price index which accounts
for the e￿ciency impact of changes in the number of ￿rms operating in the
domestic economy.
pmc(f,i) pMC
fi Firm-speci￿c index of ￿xed and variable cost, the commodity produced in
sector zfi.
2.3 Income Levels
ra M Representative household income
tls TLS Lump-sum tax associated with public budget constraint3 Equations
3.1 Arbitrage Conditions
? yi The value of domestic and export market supply from sector i equals the cost
of inputs. Inputs are combined in a nested CES producting function which
may include any of the following: materials (pm), business services (ps), skilled












? ai The consumer price of a commodity re￿ects the cost of domestic, imported















k ￿kipk i 2 CRT S
? ei The relative price of exports is equal to the (foreign-currency denominated)
FOB world market price (￿ pX
i ) times the price index of foreign exchange:
p
X
i = ￿ p
X
i ￿
? mi The relative price of imports is equal to the (foreign-currency denominated)
CIF world market price (￿ pM
i ) times the price index of foreign exchange:
p
M
i = ￿ p
M
i ￿? sfi Consistent with large-group monopositic competition, the purchase price of
￿rm output is equal to the marginal cost times the inverse elasticity of demand:
p
DS
fi = cfi=￿f 8i 2 IRT S
in which the costs functions of domestic and multinational ￿rms are determined










? nfi Free entry assures zero pro￿ts in any sector. This implies that gross revenue
is equal to the sum of ￿xed and variable costs of production. ( ￿fi is a scale
factor re￿ecting the magnitude of ￿xed costs per ￿rm which calibrated based
on zero pro￿ts in the benchmark data):
cfi(￿finfi + Sfi) = p
DS
fi Sfi 8i 2 IRT S
? zfi A single activity produces composite inputs for both ￿xed and variable costs
of production or ￿rm time f in sector i. Production costs include domestic
inputs (pD
i ), imported inputs (pV




















i = ￿ p
V
i ￿
3.2 Market Clearance Conditions
? ￿ Trade balance constraint { the FOB value of exports equals the CIF value of












i Vi + ￿ D
FDI-related imports in this equation are determined both by output and by








? pi Commodity markets { aggregate supply equals intermediate demand, ￿nal












+ ￿iM=pi + ￿ Ia
I




i Domestic output markets { supply of domestic goods equals sales to aggregate
















i 2 IRTS? pM
i Import markets { aggregate imports include sales to the aggregate demand

























i Sector-speci￿c capital supply equals capital demand:







fi Firm-speci￿c capital supply equals capital demand:











fi Supply of ￿rm-speci￿c costs equals the sum of variable and ￿xed costs:
zfi = sfi + ￿finfi3.3 Income Balance Conditions Conditions















i;f ￿ Rif ￿ TLS
? TLS Government income constraint determines lump-sum taxes at a rate which
produces no change in the level of public sector output:





i + ￿ Ga
G
i ) ￿ ￿F4 Appendix: Calibration
We have a model in which there are N sectors, a subset of which involve production
subject to increasing returns to scale and large-group monopolistic competition.
In such a setting, the individual ￿rm perceives itself ass atomistic, yet it faces a
downward sloping demand curve for its di￿erentiated good. The elasticity of demand
for an individual ￿rm’s product is essentially independent of the number of ￿rms in
the market, and the markup of price over marginal cost is therefore constant.
The key elaboration over the standard monopolistic competition model which we
have made in this analysis is to di￿erentiate domestic and FDI ￿rm types, both in
the benchmark equilibrium and in the counterfactual calculation. There are many
domestic and many multinational ￿rms, but they are subject to di￿erent regulatory
constraints and implicit taxes in the base equilibrium data. Furthermore, the two
types of ￿rms produce output using di￿erent technologies, e.g. FDI ￿rms have a
higher imported value share in production.
In this appendix we ￿rst go through the detailed logic of the imperfect competi-
tion model and outline ￿rst-order conditions and market clearance equations which
de￿ne an equilibrium. Then we describe how we ￿nd a base year equilibrium dataset
based on aggregate sectoral ￿ows from the input-output table and a few additional
statistics which characterize the base year activities of domestic and FDI ￿rms.
Following the standard scale economy formulation with declining average costand constant marginal cost, there are ￿xed and variable components of total cost.
Hence, for a given ￿rm type f in a typical industry,4 the total cost function is given
by:
Cf(q) = Ff + cfq
in which Ff represents ￿xed costs and cf is the constant marginal cost of a repre-
sentative type f ￿rm.
The equilibrium condition for pro￿t maximization can be found by solving









When the elasticity of demand, ￿f is constant, then the markup on marginal cost is
￿xed. In the model we write this pricing equation as
pf = (1 + ￿f)cf
in which ￿f = 1=(￿f ￿ 1) is the optimal markup expressed on a net basis.
There are two ￿rm types: domestic (f = D) and foreign (f = F). Individual
￿rms are symmetric within the two categories, so that under an assumption of free
entry the zero pro￿t condition determines the number ￿rms in each type by equating
4The implicit industry subscript i is suppressed. We subsequently denote imperfectly competi-
tive sectors as a subset of all commodities, I 2 I.markup revenue to ￿xed costs:
￿fcfNfqf = ￿fcfQf = NfFf
in which Qf = Nfqf is aggregate output of type f ￿rms.
An important idea in the model formulation is that free entry implies zero excess
pro￿ts, so that the value of markup revenue equals the value of aggregate ￿xed costs.
Hence, we have an identity that relates total expenditure for a type of good to total
cost of production for that good:
pfQf = cfQf + NfFf = NfCf(qf)
Any rents generated by markups over marginal cost accrue to ￿xed costs of produc-
tion. The production costs, in turn, are composed of three components. where
dD
f represents domestically produced inputs to ￿rm production,
dM
f represents imported inputs to ￿rm production,
dN
f represents inputs of ￿rm-type-speci￿c factors
In the absence of speci￿c data we assume that the composition of inputs to ￿xed
and variables costs are identical and represent an identical aggregation of domestic,imported and ￿rm-type-speci￿c inputs: 5







The primary data source for our model is an input-output table for 1995 in
which a number oindividual service sectors have been disagggregated. The source
data relevant to the imperfectly competitive sectors include:
Di Supply to the domestic market,
Ei Exports,
Mi Aggregate imports
V Ai Sectoral value-added
IDi Sectoral intermediate demand
Ai Aggregate domestic expenditure
TT i Trade and transport costs
These data satisfy the conventional input-output accounting identities. First,
the value of aggregate expenditure equals the sum of sales by domestic producers
and imports:
Ai = Di + Mi
5When marginal and ￿xed costs have an identical composition and the markup over marginal
cost is constant, then the ratio of ￿xed costs to variable costs remains constant, resulting in constant
output per ￿rm.Second, the value of output exhausts the cost of production:
Di + Ei = V Ai + IDi
In addition to the input-output statistics we add three additional data which
characterize imperfectly-competitive sectors and FDI activities:
￿
FDI
i Fraction of base year output in sector i which is supply by FDI ￿rms.
￿
M
f;i Share of production inputs for type f ￿rms which are imported.
￿fi Elasticity of supply of type f ￿rms in sector i with respect to the rate of return.
￿fi Implicit tax on ￿rm type f in sector i, representing base year barriers to FDI.
The calibration procedure infers a set of benchmark equilibrium values so as
to retain benchmark consistency and applies additional assumptions regarding the
cost structure of ￿rms and their market share. The values which are inferred by the
calibration process include:
Di Domestic supply to the domestic market,
Mi Aggregate imports
V Ai Sectoral value-added,
AD
i \Ancillary demand" for domestic goods or services, representing domestic out-
put from sector i which is unrelated to the output of imperfectly competitive
￿rms.AM
i \Ancillary demand" for imported goods, representing imports of goods associ-
ated with sector i which is unrelated to the output of imperfectly competitive
￿rms.
MCf;i Aggregate marginal cost (Nfcf(qf)),
FCf;i Aggregate ￿xed costs (NfFf))










f0;i i 2 fdi (8)











f;i) i 2 fdi (9)







f;i i 2 I (10)
Aggregate imports include imported inputs to the FDI and Dixit-Stiglitz goods








i i 2 I (11)













i + MCf;i(1 + ￿f;i) + TT i i 2 I (13)







f;i = (MCf;i + FCf;i+)(1 ￿ ￿fi) i 2 I
Value-added in the increasing returns sectors must be adjusted proportionally
with changes in the value of output in order to retain zero pro￿t, hence:
V Ai ￿ V Ai = (Di ￿ Di)(1 ￿ t
y
i) i 2 I (14)
Free entry drives pro￿ts to zero, so ￿xed cost equals the value of markup revenue:
FCf;i = ￿f;iMCf;i i 2 I (15)
Adjustment targets are made for made for both imports and value-added, and
the relative importance of adjustments depend on a calibration parameter ￿ which





(V Ai ￿ V Ai)2
V Ai
+ (1 ￿ ￿)
(Mi ￿ Mi)2
Mi